We introduce the concept of control centrality to quantify the ability of a single node to control a directed weighted network. We calculate the distribution of control centrality for several real networks and find that it is mainly determined by the network's degree distribution. We rigorously prove that in a directed network without loops the control centrality of a node is uniquely determined by its layer index or topological position in the underlying hierarchical structure of the network. Inspired by the deep relation between control centrality and hierarchical structure in a general directed network, we design an efficient attack strategy against the controllability of malicious networks.
guide the whole network to any desired final state [12] . Yet, this minimum driver set (MDS) is usually not unique, but one can often achieve multiple potential control configurations with the same number of driver nodes. Given that some nodes may appear in some MDSs but not in other, a crucial question remains unanswered: what is the role of each individual node in controlling a complex system? Therefore the question that we address in this paper pertains to the importance of a given node in maintaining a system's controllability. Consider a complex system described by a directed weighted network of N nodes whose time evolution follows the linear time-invariant dynamicṡ x(t) = A x(t) + B u(t)
where x(t) = (x 1 (t), x 2 (t), · · · , x N (t)) T ∈ R N captures the state of each node at time t.
A ∈ R N ×N is an N × N matrix describing the weighted wiring diagram of the network. The matrix element a ij ∈ R gives the strength or weight that node j can affect node i. Positive has full rank, a criteria often called Kalman's controllability rank condition [18] . The rank of the controllability matrix C, denoted by rank(C), provides the dimension of the controllable subspace of the system (A, B) [18, 19] . When we control node i only, B reduces to the vector b (i) with a single non-zero entry, and we denote C with C (i) . We can therefore use rank(
as a natural measure of node i's ability to control the system: if rank(C (i) ) = N , then node i alone can control the whole system, i.e. it can drive the system between any points in the N -dimensional state space in finite time. Any value of rank(C (i) ) less than N provides the dimension of the subspace i can control. In particular if rank(C (i) ) = 1, then node i can only control itself.
The precise value of rank(C) is difficult to determine because in reality the system parameters, i.e. the elements of A and B, are often not known precisely except the zeros that mark the absence of connections between components of the system [21] . Hence A and B are often considered to be structured matrices, i.e. their elements are either fixed zeros or independent free parameters [21] . Apparently, rank(C) varies as a function of the free parameters of A and B. However, it achieves the maximal value for all but an exceptional set of values of the free parameters which forms a proper variety with Lebesgue measure zero in the parameter space [22, 23] . This maximal value is called the generic rank of the controllability matrix C, denoted as rank g (C), which also represents the generic dimension of the controllable subspace. When rank g (C) = N , the system (A, B) is structurally controllable, i.e. controllable for almost all sets of values of the free parameters of A and B except an exceptional set of values with zero measure [21, 22, 24, 25] . For a single node i, rank g (C (i) ) captures the "power" of i in controlling the whole network, allowing us to define the control centrality of node i as
The calculation of rank g (C) can be mapped into a combinatorial optimization problem on a directed graph G(A, B) constructed as follows [23] . Connect the M input nodes {u 1 , · · · , u M } to the N state nodes {x 1 , · · · , x N } in the original network according to the input matrix B, i.e. connect u j to x i if b ij = 0, obtaining a directed graph G(A, B) with N + M nodes (see Fig. 1a and b) . A state node j is called accessible if there is at least one directed path reaching from one of the input nodes to node j. In Fig. 1b , all state nodes {x 1 , · · · , x 7 } are accessible from the input node u 1 . A stem is a directed path starting from an input node, so that no nodes appear more than once in it, e.g. Fig. 1b . Denote with G s the stem-cycle disjoint subgraph of G (A, B) , such that G s consists 3 of stems and cycles only, and the stems and cycles have no node in common (highlighted in Fig. 1b) . According to Hosoe's theorem [23] , the generic dimension of the controllable subspace is given by
with G the set of all stem-cycle disjoint subgraphs of the accessible part of G(A, B) and |E(G s )| the number of edges in the subgraph G s . For example, the subgraph highlighted in Fig. 1b , denoted as G max s
, contains the largest number of edges among all possible stemcycle disjoint subgraphs. Thus, C c (1) = rank g (C (1) ) = 6, which is the number of red links in Fig. 1b . Note that rank g (C (1) ) = 6 < N = 7, the whole system is therefore not structurally controllable by controlling x 1 only. Yet, the nodes covered by the G max s highlighted in Fig. 1b, e.g. {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 7 }, constitute a structurally controllable subsystem [25] . In other words, by controlling node x 1 with a time dependent signal u 1 (t) we can drive the subsystem is not unique. For example, in Fig. 1b we can get the same
and thus a different structurally controllable subsystem {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 }.
Both subsystems are of size six, which is exactly the generic dimension of the controllable subspace. Note that we can fully control each subsystem individually, yet we cannot fully control the whole system.
The advantage of Eq. (3) is that max Gs∈G |E(G)| can be calculated via linear programming [26] , providing us an efficient numerical tool to determine the control centrality and the structurally controllable subsystem of any node in an arbitrary complex network (see
Supplementary Material Sec.I.A).
We first consider the distribution of control centrality. Shown in Fig. 2 is the distribution of the normalized control centrality (c c (i) ≡ C c (i)/N ) for several real networks. We find that for the intra-organization network, P (c c ) has a sharp peak at c c = 1, suggesting that a high fraction of nodes can individually exert full control over the whole system (Fig. 2a) .
In contrast, for company-ownership network, P (c c ) follows an approximately exponential distribution ( Fig. 2d ), indicating that most nodes display low control centrality. Even the most powerful node, with c c ∼ 0.01, can control only one percent of the total dimension of the system's full state space. For other networks P (c c ) displays a mixed behavior, indicating the 4 coexistence of a few powerful nodes with a large number of nodes that have little control over the system's dynamics (Fig. 2b,c ). Note that under full randomization, turning a network into a directed Erdős-Rényi (ER) random network [27, 28] with number of nodes (N ) and number of edges (L) unchanged, the c c distribution changes dramatically. In contrast, under degree-preserving randomization [29, 30] , which keeps the in-degree (k in ) and out-degree (k out ) of each node unchanged, the c c distribution does not change significantly. This result suggests that P (c c ) is mainly determined by the underlying network's degree distribution
This result is very useful in the following sense: P (k in , k out ) is easy to calculate for any complex network, while the calculation of P (c c ) requires much more computational efforts (both CPU time and memory space). Studying P (c c ) for model networks of prescribed P (k in , k out ) will give us qualitative understanding of how P (c c ) changes as we vary network parameters, e.g. mean degree k . See Supplementary Material Sec.II for more details.
To understand which topological features determine the control centrality itself, we compared the control centrality for each node in the real networks and their randomized counterparts (denoted as rand-ER and rand-Degree). The lack of correlations indicates that both randomization procedures eliminate the topological feature that determines the control centrality of a given node (see Supplementary Material Sec.I.B). Since accessibility plays an important role in maintaining structural controllability [21] , we conjecture that the control centrality of node i is correlated with the number of nodes N r (i) that can be reached from it.
To test this conjecture, we calculated N r (i) and C c (i) for the real networks shown in Note that in a directed star each node can be labeled with a unique layer index : the leaf nodes are in the first layer (bottom layer) and the central hub is in the second layer (top layer). In this case the control centrality of the central hub equals its layer index (see Fig. 1c ). This is not by coincidence: we can prove that for a directed network containing 5 no cycles, often called a directed acyclic graph (DAG), the control centrality of any node equals its layer index
Indeed, lacking cycles, a DAG has a unique hierarchical structure, which means that each node can be labeled with a unique layer index (l i ), calculated using a recursive labeling algorithm [31] : (1 
consists of a stem only, which starts from the input node pointing to the state node i and ends at a state node in the bottom layer, e.g. Fig. 1d . The number of edges in this stem is equal to the layer index of node i, so rank g (
Therefore in DAG the higher a node is in the hierarchy, the higher is its ability to control the system. Though this result agrees with our intuition to some extent, it is surprising at the first glance because it indicates that in a DAG the control centrality of node i is only determined by its topological position in the hierarchical structure, rather than any other importance measures, e.g. degree or betweenness centrality. This result also partially explains why driver nodes tend to avoid hubs [12] .
Despite the simplicity of Eq. (4), we cannot apply it directly to real networks, because most of them are not DAGs. Yet, we note that any directed network has a underlying DAG structure based on the strongly connected component (SCC) decomposition (see Supplementary Material Sec.I.D Fig. S4) . A subgraph of a directed network is strongly connected if there is a directed path from each node in the subgraph to every other node. The SCCs of a directed network G are its maximal strongly connected subgraphs. If we contract each SCC to a single supernode, the resulting graph G, called the condensation of G, is a DAG [32] .
Since a DAG has a unique hierarchical structure, a directed network can then be assigned an underlying hierarchical structure. The layer index of node i can be defined to be the layer index of the corresponding supernode (i.e. the SCC that node i belongs to) in G. With this definition of l i , it is easy to show that C c (i) ≥ l i for general directed networks. Furthermore, for an edge (i → j) in a general directed network, if node i is topologically "higher" than node j (i.e. l i > l j ), then C c (i) > C c (j). Since C c (i) has to be calculated via linear programming which is computationally more challenging than the calculation of l i , the above 6 results suggest an efficient way to calculate the lower bound of C c (i) and to compare the control centralities of two neighboring nodes. Note that if l i > l j and there is no directed edge (i → j) in the network, then in general one cannot conclude that C c (i) > C c (j) (see Supplementary Material Sec.I.D for more details).
Our finding on the relation between control centrality and hierarchical structure inspires us to design an efficient attack strategy against malicious networks, aiming to affect their controllability. The most efficient way to damage the controllability of a network is to remove all input nodes {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u M }, rendering the system completely uncontrollable.
But this requires a detailed knowledge of the control configuration, i.e. the wiring diagram of G (A, B) , which we often lack. If the network structure (A) is known, one can attempt a targeted attack, i.e. rank the nodes according to some centrality measure, like degree or control centrality, and remove the nodes with highest centralities [33, 34] . Though we still lack systematic studies on the effect of a targeted attack on a network's controllability, one naively expects that this should be the most efficient strategy. But we often lack the knowledge of the network structure, which makes this approach unfeasible anyway. In this case a simple strategy would be random attack, i.e. remove a randomly chosen P fraction of nodes, which naturally serves as a benchmark for any other strategy. Here we propose instead a random upstream attack strategy: randomly choose a P fraction of nodes, and for each node remove one of its incoming or upstream neighbors if it has one, otherwise remove the node itself. A random downstream attack can be defined similarly, removing the node to which the chosen node points to. In undirected networks, a similar strategy has been proposed for efficient immunization [34] and the early detection of contagious outbreaks [35] , relying on the statistical trend that randomly selected neighbors have more links than the node itself [36, 37] . In directed networks we can prove that randomly selected upstream will remove more hubs and more links than the random attack does. But the real reason why we expect a random upstream attack to be efficient in a directed network is because C c (i) ≥ C c (j) for most edges (i → j), i.e. the control centrality of the starting node is usually no less than the ending node of a directed edge. In DAGs, for any edge (i → j),
we have strictly C c (i) > C c (j) (see Supplementary Material Sec.III.B). Thus, the upstream neighbor of a node is expected to play a more important or equal role in control than the 7 node itself, a result deeply rooted in the nature of the control problem, rather than the hub status of the upstream nodes.
To show the efficiency of the random upstream attack we compare its impact on fully controlled networks with several other strategies. We start from a network that is fully controlled (rank g (C) = N ) via a minimum set of N D driver nodes. After the attack a P faction of nodes are removed, denoting with rank g (C ) the dimension of the controllable subspace of the damaged network. We calculate rank g (C ) as a function of P , with P tuned from 0 up to 1. Since the random attack serves as a natural benchmark, we calculate the difference of rank g (C ) between a given strategy and the random attack, denoted as
Apparently, the more negative is δ, the more efficient is the strategy compared to a fully random attack. We find that for most networks random upstream attack results in δ < 0 for 0 < P < 1, i.e. it causes more damage to the network's controllability than random attack (see Fig. 3b,c,d ). Moreover, random upstream attack typically is more efficient than random downstream attack, even though in both cases we remove more hubs and more links than in the random attack. This is due to the fact that the upstream (or downstream) neighbors are usually more (or less) "powerful" than the node itself.
The efficiency of the random upstream attack is even comparable to targeted attacks (Fig. 3) . Since the former requires only the knowledge of the network's local structure rather than any knowledge of the nodes' centrality measures or any other global information (i.e. the structure of the A matrix) while the latter rely heavily on them, this finding indicates the advantage of the random upstream attack. The fact that those targeted attacks do not always show significant superiority over the random attack and the random upstream (downstream) attack could be due to an overlap effect -two targeted nodes successively chosen from the rank list based on some centrality measure are likely to have larger overlap between their controllable subspaces than two randomly chosen nodes. Therefore, successively removing targeted nodes with highest centralities will not always cause the most damage to the network's controllability. Random attacks can avoid such overlap to some extent because the removed nodes are randomly chosen. This also explains why sometimes targeted attacks are worse than the random attack (see Fig. 3a ). Notice that for the intraorganization network all attack strategies fail in the sense that δ is either positive or very close to zero (Fig. 3a) . This is due to the fact this network is so dense ( k ≈ 58) that we have C c (i) = C c (j) = N for almost all the edges (i → j). Consequently, both random upstream and downstream attacks are not efficient and the C c -targeted attack shows almost the same impact as the random attack. This result suggests that when the network becomes very dense its controllability becomes extremely robust against all kinds of attacks, consistent with our previous result on the core percolation and the control robustness against link removal [12] . We also tested those attack strategies on model networks (see Supplementary
Material Sec.III.C). The results are qualitatively consistent with what we observed in real networks.
In sum, we study the control centrality of single node in complex networks and find that it is related to the underlying hierarchical structure of networks. The presented results help us better understand the controllability of complex networks and design an efficient attack strategy against network control. This work was supported by the Network Science Collab- 
